When agreeing to a surveyor binds you to the boundary

29 Oct 2025

On appeal, the High Court ruled that the parties were bound by a binding boundary agreement to accept the determination of their jointly instructed surveyor, confirming that the agreement was effective as a clarification of the boundary, though not a contract for the disposition of land requiring formal writing.

Facts:

The Creas, owners of The Heathers, initiated proceedings against the Camps, owners of the neighbouring property Sunnyside, seeking a declaration as to the true boundary. They asserted that part of the Camps' bungalow and garage had been built on their land. They did not seek the removal of such buildings but rather payment of damages in lieu of the parts of their land that had been built upon. 

Mr. and Mrs Camp countered by asserting the boundary had already been determined by a binding boundary agreement between the parties to accept the conclusions of a jointly instructed surveyor. This agreement had allegedly been formed by an exchange of correspondence in December 2016. 

In August 2024, a County Court Judge ruled that the parties had entered into a binding agreement. Mr and Mrs Crea appealed the decision. 

Decision

The High Court dismissed the appeal, as the Court agreed that the parties had formed a valid, binding contract to accept the surveyor's determination. The Judge ruled that, on an objective reading of the December 2016 correspondence, the parties demonstrated a clear intent to enter a binding agreement to submit their dispute to expert determination. The Creas' letter of 12 December 2016, which agreed to the joint instruction of Lewis Brown and told the Camps to "proceed," was held to be an unqualified acceptance of the Camps' counteroffer. 

The Creas' silence on the binding term was not fatal to the contract. The High Court applied principles from contract law (citing Chitty and Midgulf), finding that the letter "appeared to treat the parties' agreement as having been concluded" and did not invite further discussion. Following the longstanding principle from Neilson v. Poole, the Court upheld the view that boundary agreements are "acts of peace" that quiet strife and should be encouraged.

The agreement was for the expert to "assess or define" the boundary. Mr. Brown fulfilled this by defining a boundary line (the pragmatic A-G line), even after concluding that the exact legal boundary was impossible to determine due to encroachments and lack of evidence.

Implications:

This case strongly reaffirms the judicial preference for, and the binding nature of, boundary demarcation agreements. Boundary agreements are “acts of peace” that should be encouraged and enforced to avoid costly litigation. Moreover, this judgement tacitly encourages the use of jointly instructed experts as a definitive alternative to court litigation.

By defining an unclear or uncertain boundary, the agreement is deemed to have established the "true and ancient limits" of the ownership for all time. This clarification of the legal estate gives the agreement a proprietary effect (in that it defines the land itself), rather than being merely a personal contract between the neighbours. Such agreements generally bind successors in title, regardless of whether those future owners had knowledge of the agreement when they purchased the property. This ensures that boundaries remain stable and fixed in the long term.

The case confirms that boundary demarcation agreements are largely exempt from the strict formalities required for land contracts. The Court affirmed that, because the principal purpose of the agreement was to demarcate an unclear boundary, it was not a "contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land" and, therefore, did not need to comply with the requirement for signed writing under Section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.

Source:EWHC | 28-10-2025

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